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The article examines the implications of the creation in 2017 of a 'Permanent 
Structured Cooperation on security and defence' (PESCO), that could lead to the 
gradual construction of a European Army. In particular, it focuses on the institutional 
issues linked to the possibility of deploying European armed forces in conflict scenarios 
and analyses the governance of the European common security and defence policy. In 
this respect, the decision-making power in matters of common defence and PESCO is 
concentrated in the hands of the Council and of the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, without the European Parliament being 
directly involved in the relevant decision-making processes. The article aims to 
illustrate the constitutional reasons in favour of greater involvement of the European 
Parliament in this area. Moreover, it will evaluate the ways in which the democratic 
control on future EU military missions could be increased. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A new event, which had the potential to be of extraordinary importance in 
the process of European integration within the Common Security and 
Defence Policy, occurred at the end of 2017. This was the creation of a 
'Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence' (PESCO), 
pursuant to Article 42, paragraph 6, of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
The permanent structured cooperation involves, as Article 42(6) TEU states, 
'Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which 
have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view 
to the most demanding missions'. PESCO was originally conceived as a 
'locomotive' designed to drive the entire common security and defence 
policy,1 the latter of which constitutes, within the meaning of Article 42, 'an 
 
1 On the European security and defence policy, see, among the others: Alyson J. K. 
Bailes, 'The EU and a Better World: What Role for the European Security and 
Defence Policy?' (2008) 84 International Affairs 115; Anne Deighton, 'The 
European Security and Defence Policy' (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 719; Tuomas Forsberg, 'Security and Defense Policy in the New European 
Constitution: A Critical Assessment' (2004) 3 Connections 13; Jolyon Howorth, 
Security and defence policy in the European Union (Palgrave 2007); Jolyon Howorth, 
'European Defence and the Changing Politics of the European Union: Hanging 
Together or Hanging Separately?' (2001) 39 Journal of Common Market Studies 
765; Chris J. Bickerton, Bastien Irondelle, Anand Menon, 'Security Co-operation 
beyond the Nation-State: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy' (2011) 
49 Journal of Common Market Studies 1; Hanna Ojanen, 'The EU and Nato: Two 
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integral part of the common foreign and security policy' of the European 
Union.2 As such, PESCO seems able to facilitate the achievement of the 
various stages of the integration process outlined in the second paragraph of 
Article 42: 'The common security and defence policy shall include the 
progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a 
common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so 
decides'. The leap in quality made by PESCO lies precisely in the binding 
nature of the commitments undertaken by the Member States in this very 
delicate area. 
The overarching aim of the integration process set out in Article 42 is very 
ambitious and ultimately consists in the gradual construction of a European 
supranational military power able to intervene in conflict scenarios on a 
mandate and under the aegis of the European Union. The achievement of this 
goal would allow the Union to express a unified stance in matters of common 
foreign and defence policy and to become one of the main actors on the 
international scene, being the bearer of an EU Global Strategy. Thus, Europe, 
with its own European Army, could become a decisive player in the context 
of NATO and the UN. Additionally, it could enter into direct dialogue with 
national military superpowers, which until now have been the undisputed 
protagonists both in armed conflicts and in subsequent 'reconstruction' 
policies. 
The implications of PESCO are many and concern, not only the future, but 
also the present. First of all, PESCO sets the foundation for unprecedented 
cooperation in the fields of military industry, training and mobility of the 
armed forces, sharing of strategic information and so on. Moreover, in the 
Community tradition the common market has always been a driver of 
integration. This is why the drive to achieve ever more ambitious military 
 
Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy' (2006) 44 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 57. 
2 On the common foreign and security policy, see, among the others: Douglas Hurd, 
'Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy' (1994) 70 International 
Affairs 421; Maria-Gisella Garbagnati Ketvel, 'The Jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice in Respect of the Common Foreign and Security Policy' (2006) 55 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 77; Nadia Klein and Wolfgang 
Wessels, 'CFSP Progress or Decline after Lisbon?' (2013) 18 European Foreign 
Affairs Review 449. 
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industrial projects at the European level could facilitate the gradual 
formation of a European army and, consequently, the basis for a strong 
common foreign and defence policy. On the other hand, this cooperation also 
affects the relevant issues pertaining to the relationship between the EU, 
NATO and the UN, and to the internationalist profiles of military missions. 
However, as this strictly relates to international law, it falls outside the scope 
of this work.  
Each of these aspects raises a series of questions that are of great legal – and 
non-legal – interest and hence it is necessary to carefully delimit the context 
of the present research. This article focuses on the institutional issues linked 
to the future prospect, now less distant than in the past, of the birth of a 
strong common defence policy of the European Union, based on the 
possibility of deploying European armed forces in operational scenarios. 
The extensive literature on the European security and defence policy (ESDP) 
mainly deals with describing and analysing the activities of the European 
Union in relevant crisis areas and the connected foreign policy missions,3 the 
impact of the ESDP,4 or the institutional framework developed to support 
the ESDP.5 With specific reference to PESCO, the literature focuses above 
all on the concrete implications and on the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation,6 with particular regard to the legal 
nature and enforceability of the binding commitments agreed to.7 In 
contrast, relatively little attention is paid to whether or not the internal 
management of the EU defence governance is adequate with respect to 
 
3 See, for example, Alessia Biava, 'The Emergence of a Strategic Culture within the 
Common Security and Defence Policy' (2011) 16 European Foreign Affairs Review 
41. 
4 See, among the others, Anand Menon, 'Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten' 
(2009) 85 International Affairs 227. 
5 See, for example, Hans-Georg Ehrhart, 'The EU as a Civil-Military Crisis Manager: 
Coping with Internal Security Governance' (2006) 61 International Journal 433. 
6 See, for example, Sven Biscop, 'Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Future 
of the ESDP: Transformation and Integration' (2008) 13 European Foreign Affairs 
Review 431. 
7 See Steven Blockmans, 'The EU's Modular Approach to Defence Integration: an 
Inclusive, Ambitious and Legally Binding PESCO?' (2018) 55 Common Market Law 
Review 1785. 
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general legal principles like democracy. The latter issue is the subject of the 
present research. 
Adopting a constitutional approach, this article aims to analyse the 
governance of the European common defence policy, looking specifically at 
the prospect of military interventions carried out under the aegis of the 
European Union.8 The crux of the matter is the lack of involvement of the 
European Parliament (EP) in the decision of the EU to set up a military 
mission involving the sending of European armed forces in conflict scenarios. 
Constitutional law generally does not provide an exhaustive regulation of the 
power to intervene militarily in conflict scenarios. However, the institutional 
practice of contemporary democracies and the interpretation of the relevant 
constitutions normally seek to achieve a difficult balance between the need 
to guarantee the effectiveness and efficiency of military missions and the 
need to subordinate the exercise of the power of military intervention to 
democratic-parliamentary control (section II). In contrast, on the 
supranational level, the decision-making power in matters of common 
defence and PESCO is concentrated in the hands of the Council and of the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
without the European Parliament being directly involved in the relevant 
decision-making processes (section III). 
The present article aims to verify whether or not the current legislative 
framework of the TEU contradicts some basic constitutional principles that 
are part – or have now become part – of the 'constitutional' heritage of the 
EU (section IV). The principles with which the current governance of the 
European common defence could conflict belong to two main categories: 1) 
those that emerge directly from the Treaties, such as the principle of 
institutional balance and the principle of representative democracy, which 
can no longer be relegated to the scope of the old 'first pillar'; and 2) those 
that emerge from the common constitutional traditions of the Member 
States. In this respect, in many EU Member States the need to subordinate 
the sending of the armed forces in conflict scenarios to specific parliamentary 
 
8 For a review of the literature on EU governance, see, among others, John Peterson, 
'The choice for EU theorists: Establishing a common framework for analysis' 
(2001) 39 European Journal of Political Research 289. 
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authorization or to prior parliamentary debate has in recent years been 
affirmed. Indeed, this principle has been expressly sanctioned or interpreted 
by the constitution of those Member States, with the exception of cases of 
urgency and necessity (section V). 
This paper assumes that the EP is an essential organ for ensuring a minimum 
level of institutional balance, transparency, open political confrontation and 
democratic method in the supranational decision-making processes and in 
the formation of the Union's policies. This is so within the delimited 
framework of the EU institutional set-up and of 'European 
constitutionalism', even if the EP is not comparable to national parliaments.9 
Moreover, since the Lisbon Treaty has sanctioned the removal of the pillar 
structure and determined the definitive fusion of the Communities within 
the European Union, the current governance of common foreign and security 
policy can no longer be considered completely detached from the real 
Community dimension. On the contrary, the common foreign and security 
policy is now partly integrated into the Union legal order and, consequently, 
can no longer take shape fully as a form of intergovernmental cooperation.  
On this basis, at the end of the present analysis we will evaluate how the 
redistribution of powers could be made in order to establish a power of 
effective control of the EP on future EU military missions and to increase 
democratic control of the latter (section VI). 
II. DEMOCRATIC CONTROL VERSUS MILITARY EFFICIENCY: THE 
DIFFICULT SEARCH FOR BALANCE 
Normally, constitutional law does not provide an exhaustive regulation of the 
power to intervene militarily in conflict scenarios. This is because 
constitutional texts have often not been updated in this area and therefore 
are influenced by the now obsolete concept of war in the formal sense, namely 
war 'lawfully waged', based on constitutional and international rules. 
 
9 Because of the issue of the democratic deficit referred to it. See, for example, Jean 
Blondel, Richard Sinnott, Palle Svensson, People and Parliament in the European 
Union: Participation, Democracy, and Legitimacy (Oxford University Press 1998); 
Michael Goodhart, 'Europe's Democratic Deficits through the Looking Glass: 
The European Union as a Challenge for Democracy' (2007) 5 Perspectives on 
Politics 567. 
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Furthermore, it is inevitable and even appropriate that a written constitution 
leaves much of the regulation of this complex subject to organic laws 
implementing the constitutional provisions, to parliamentary rules, to 
constitutional conventions and application practices. 
In any case, the institutional practice of contemporary democracies and the 
interpretation of the respective constitutions generally seek to achieve a 
difficult balance between the need to guarantee the effectiveness and 
efficiency of military missions and the need to subordinate the exercise of the 
power of military intervention to democratic-parliamentary control.10 In 
many constitutional democracies, this balance has been found in the 
allocation of the decision-making power to commence a military action to 
the executive body, and of the power of prior authorization/approval of such 
decision to the parliamentary body (see below, section V). Among the 
countries that have developed this solution, by means of conventions and/or 
legislative acts, there are some – such as Belgium, Germany and Italy – which 
are particularly relevant for the present research. They represent a significant 
constitutional parameter capable of influencing the evolution of the 
European Union's legal system in this matter. 
Apart from some exceptions, in the evolution of democratic states the 
parliament's power to approve or authorize the declaration of war in a formal 
sense established itself across all the main forms of government (see below, 
section V). Although in the practice of the main constitutional democracies 
this principle has not had continued application, the power in question must 
be considered as a sort of unavoidable parliamentary attribution, like 
legislative and budgetary power.11 
As war in the formal sense has become mostly obsolete, it seems reasonable 
that even the power of war in a substantial sense, namely the power to deploy 
 
10 See Dirk Peters and Wolfgang Wagner, 'Between Military Efficiency and 
Democratic Legitimacy: Mapping Parliamentary War Powers in Contemporary 
Democracies, 1989–2004' (2011) 64 Parliamentary Affairs 175. 
11 See Tapio Raunio and Wolfgang Wagner, 'Towards Parliamentarisation of 
Foreign and Security Policy?' (2017) 40 West European Politics 1; Daan Fonck and 
Yf Reykers, 'Parliamentarisation as a Two-Way Process: Explaining Prior 
Parliamentary Consultation for Military Interventions' (2018) 71 Parliamentary 
Affairs 674. 
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the armed forces in conflict scenarios with or without an 'international 
coverage',12 should be subject to parliamentary authorization. Indeed, similar 
to arguments justifying the conferral to parliament of legislative functions, 
also with reference to the decision-making processes related to military 
missions the involvement of the parliamentary body would allow the full 
participation of all the represented political forces. It thus allows the 
opposition to give its contribution to the discussion, whatever the majority 
decides.13 In contrast, the executive cannot guarantee the complexity, depth 
and transparency of the decision-making processes ensured by the 
parliamentary body, both within parliamentary committees and within the 
plenary assembly. 
However, these greater guarantees of the decision-making procedures of 
parliamentary bodies are sometimes incompatible with the needs pertaining 
to the exercise of military and war powers, which for this reason are 
traditionally conferred to the executive.14 In many cases, the political 
decision to start a military action requires speed and unity of purpose; 
moreover, the secrecy of operational plans is often a necessary condition for 
their effective realisation. These needs can certainly justify a proportionate 
and reasonable limitation of the supervisory power of parliament over the 
military powers of the executive, but can never lead to its complete exclusion. 
In principle, the complete exclusion of parliament and of the relevant 
parliamentary committees from the decision-making process related to the 
commencement of a military action can only be justified by the need to 
respond to a serious and immediate threat to national security. However, this 
is on the understanding that the problem of the executive's wide discretion 
in the assessment of that need persists.  
The assessment of the needs related to military-defensive efficiency requires 
a great deal of balance and consideration which, by necessity, focuses on the 
 
12 War in a substantial sense includes the different types of military missions that 
cannot be defined as 'war' in a formal sense.  
13 See Patrick A Mello and Dirk Peters, 'Parliaments in security policy: Involvement, 
politicisation, and influence' (2018) 20 The British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations 3. 
14 See J. Locke, 'Two Treatises of government', in The Works of John Locke (vol. II, 
London, printed for John Churchill 1714) 199, sec. 147. 
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discretion of the executive. Of course, the executive may consider that, due 
to higher requirements related to national security, it is necessary to sacrifice 
the prior parliamentary control of the power to intervene militarily. In such 
cases, the only guarantee of democratic control remaining would consist, ex 
post, in the political accountability of the government to the parliament 
and/or to the voters, depending on the form of government.  
In fact, such decision could hardly be subject to control by the ordinary 
courts15 and in this respect the case law of the United Kingdom and of the 
United States is particularly significant.16 As we will try to illustrate, recent 
developments in the European Union's common security and defence policy 
suggest that many of these issues could arise, mutatis mutandis, even in the 
European supranational context. 
III. THE CURRENT REGULATION OF PESCO AND THE ABSENCE OF AN 
ADEQUATE FORM OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 
As a preliminary point, it is worth briefly recalling the main steps that led to 
the creation of PESCO in December 2017. An important impulse was given 
by the conclusions adopted by the European Council on 22/23 June 2017, 
which promoted the need to create an 'inclusive and ambitious' Permanent 
Structured Cooperation. The European Council's mandate was to draw up, 
within three months, 
a common list of criteria and binding commitments fully in line with Articles 
42(6) and 46 TEU and Protocol 10 to the Treaty - including with a view to 
the most demanding missions […], with a precise timetable and specific 
 
15 Rather, if provided for in the single legal system in question, a possible appeal to 
the Constitutional Court could be involved. In that case, the possible breach of the 
duty of prior consultation of the parliamentary body could be established only after 
the military intervention. Such a control could nevertheless be useful both for the 
purpose of clarifying the constitutional interpretation, and to enforce, in the most 
serious cases, the legal and institutional liability of the members of the 
Government for an illegitimate exercise of their functions. 
16 For example, on the position of the Supreme Court and on the role of the Courts 
in deciding whether the President has overstepped his power in conducting 
warfare, see Jules Lobel, 'The Commander in Chief and the Courts' (2007) 37 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 49. 
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assessment mechanisms, in order to enable Member States which are in a 
position to do so to notify their intentions to participate without delay.17 
On 13 November 2017 the Foreign and Defence Ministers of 23 countries, 
since increased to 25 – all Member States except the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Malta – signed a common notification regarding their 
intention to participate in Permanent Structured Cooperation.18 At the third 
point of Annex I (Principles of PESCO) it states:  
PESCO is a crucial step towards strengthening the common defence policy. 
It could be an element of a possible development towards a common defence 
should the Council by unanimous vote decide so (as provided for in article 
42.2 TEU). A long term vision of PESCO could be to arrive at a coherent full 
spectrum force package - in complementarity with NATO, which will 
continue to be the cornerstone of collective defence for its members.19 
Despite the latter reassuring concession to NATO, the creation of a 'future' 
European army will be primarily functional as an independent foreign and 
defence policy of the Union. Indeed, this seems to be precisely the idea 
underlying the following point 8 of Annex I:  
An inclusive PESCO is as a strong political signal towards our citizens and 
the outside world: Governments of EU Member States are taking common 
security and defence seriously and pushing it forward. For EU citizens it 
means more security and a clear sign of willingness of all Member States to 
foster common security and defence to achieve the goals set by EU Global 
Strategy. 
A European army and its use in conflict scenarios will therefore be not only 
an instrument to be made available to the Atlantic Pact or the UN resolutions 
authorizing an armed intervention. In fact, it will primarily be an instrument 
that may be used in the EU Global Strategy, although at present the political 
conditions for this common strategy seem to be some time away. 
Finally, with the decision of 11 December 2017, the Foreign Affairs Council 
of the European Union, following the common notification of 13 November 
 
17 European Council meeting, 22 and 23 June 2017, Conclusions. 
18 Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 13 November 2017. 
19 Ibid, Annex I (Principles of PESCO). 
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and acting by qualified majority (Article 46.2 TEU), sanctioned the official 
birth of the 'Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence'.20 
The creation of a European military force that can be deployed in operational 
scenarios is a possibility already fully shaped by Article 43 TEU, which 
clarifies the content of the missions 'in the course of which the Union may 
use civilian and military means', to which Article 42(1) refers. They include, 
inter alia, 'conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict 
stabilisation'. Article 43 also states that '[a]ll these tasks may contribute to 
the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in 
combating terrorism in their territories'. This is clearly confirmed by 
Protocol 10 relating to PESCO. Indeed, Article 1 of this Protocol established 
the achievement in 2010 of the ambitious objective of forging supranational 
battlegroups to be used for the purposes of Article 43 TEU. 
As regards the regulation of the decision-making processes related to 
PESCO, first of all it must be considered that the 'common security and 
defence policy', regulated in Section 2 of Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU, is 
part of the wider 'common foreign and security policy'. The latter is regulated 
in the whole of Chapter 2, which is in turn included in the general subject of 
the 'Union's external action' treated by the whole Title V. Chapter 1 of Title 
V contains 'general provisions on the Union's external action', while Chapter 
2 contains 'specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy', 
which includes the 'common security and defence policy'. It follows that 
many of the rules of the whole Title V, being general rules, apply also to the 
more specific subject of the 'common security and defence policy'. 
If we examine the general provisions on the Union's external action 
contained in Chapter 1 of Title V, it is possible to immediately find a general 
prevalence accorded by the TEU to the European Council and to the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in the 
matters falling under the former second pillar. Pursuant to Article 22, in fact, 
the European Council 'shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of 
the Union' relating to the external action and to the common foreign and 
 
20 Council Decision establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and 
determining the list of Participating Member States, 11 December 2017.  
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defence policy. The High Representative may instead 'submit joint proposals 
to the Council' for the area of common foreign and security policy, while the 
Commission can submit joint proposals to the Council 'for other areas of 
external action'. 
Chapter 2 broadly confirms this general approach. Article 24 establishes that 
the common foreign and security policy is 'defined and implemented by the 
European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the 
Treaties provide otherwise'. As better specified in Article 26, while the 
European Council must establish the general guidelines for the common 
foreign and security policy, the Council must define and implement it in 
concrete terms.  
On the other hand, Article 24 gives the High Representative of the Union, 
who also chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, the power to 'put into effect' the 
common foreign and security policy. This 'executive' function is better 
defined in Articles 26 and 27, which assign to the High Representative the 
important function of external representation of the Union that is connected 
to their appellative.  
A very marginal position is therefore left to the European Parliament and to 
the Commission. Firstly, because in this matter 'the adoption of legislative 
acts shall be excluded' (Article 24, first paragraph). Secondly because, with 
regard to the functions of the European Parliament and of the Commission, 
Article 24 merely states that their specific role 'in this area is defined by the 
Treaties'. As such, the scope for action of the EP and the Commission is 
limited to the powers specifically granted by the Treaties. 
The Court of Justice, then, is completely excluded from any possibility of 
intervention, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance 
with Article 40 of TEU and to review the legality of certain decisions as 
provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 40, in particular, 
contains a 'residual' clause, according to which  
the implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not 
affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the 
institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union 
competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union.  
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Despite the apparent narrowness of this concession, it must be disclosed that 
such a general clause could theoretically allow, in the future, significant 
creative judgments. Indeed, it could allow some kind of re-evaluation of the 
role that the EP and the Commission could play in this matter, through an 
interpretation of the Treaty of which the Court of Justice should take charge 
(see below, section VI).21 
With regard to the limited competences that are specifically attributed to 
the EP by Title V on the common foreign and security policy, the most 
relevant provision is Article 36. This concerns the duty of the High 
Representative to inform and regularly consult the European Parliament on 
the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security 
policy and the common security and defence policy. The High 
Representative must also ensure that the views of the European Parliament 
are duly taken into consideration. Article 36 then states that the European 
Parliament can address questions and make recommendations to the Council 
or to the High Representative, and that a debate on progress made in this area 
must be held twice a year. Apart from the right to be informed and consulted, 
the EP has no direct decision-making power to prevent the Council from 
assuming certain choices of common foreign and security policy. Conversely, 
a certain influence could be exercised indirectly on the High Representative, 
who has the task, on the one hand, to implement the Council's decisions, but, 
on the other hand, also has to take care that the views of the EP are duly taken 
into consideration. However, we still remain in the field of moral suasion. 
Also with regard to the regulation of the Union's common security and 
defence policy, the Council and the High Representative of the Union 
remain the undisputed protagonists of the decision-making processes. It is 
indeed the Council which, acting unanimously, decides to start a mission on 
the proposal of the High Representative or of a Member State. In short, the 
Council holds the power to decide the entry of the European Union in an 
armed conflict. 
 
21 After all, the history of the Union is one of founding acts and deliberate institution-
building, as well as informal and gradual institutional evolution where common 
practices have been codified into formal-legal institutions; see Johan P. Olsen, 
'Reforming European Institutions of Governance' (2002) 40 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 581. 
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In addition, under Article 44, the Council may entrust the implementation 
of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary 
capability for such a task. These Member States, in association with the High 
Representative, shall then agree among themselves on the management of 
the task. This means that some delicate operational decisions related to the 
management of military missions carried out in the name of the European 
Union will be taken only by the governments of the states entrusted together 
with the High Representative.  
Finally, it is still the Council that, as already mentioned, decides by qualified 
majority the constitution of PESCO after consulting the High 
Representative. It remains then the protagonist of the related decision-
making processes, as emerges from Article 46 TEU.  
This succinct and unexhaustive description suffices to demonstrate the 
substantial exclusion of the European Parliament from the determinations 
that the EU can adopt in the area of the common security and defence policy. 
However, the need to provide for some forms of control on the part of the 
supranational Parliament, in such a delicate matter, is undeniable.  
It must be considered that the 'Community method' has partially 
contaminated the decision-making processes relating to the former second 
pillar,22 especially for the following two aspects. First of all, the High 
Representative, who chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and who is also Vice-
President of the Commission, is fully involved in the decisions and in the 
implementation of decisions concerning the Union's tasks.23 Secondly, there 
 
22 The 'Community method' is characterised by the sole right of the European 
Commission to initiate legislation, by the co-decision power between the Council 
and the European Parliament and by the use of qualified majority voting in Council. 
It contrasts with the intergovernmental method of operation used in decision-
making, according to which the Commission's right of initiative is confined to 
specific areas of activity, the Council generally acts unanimously and the EP has a 
purely consultative role.  
23 For a partially different opinion, see Leendert Erkelens and Steven Blockmans, 
'Setting up the European External Action Service: an act of institutional balance' 
(2012) 8 European Constitutional Law Review 246, for which the post-Lisbon 
arrangements in the field of EU external action have resulted in a small move away 
from the 'Community method' towards a more intergovernmental way of EU 
foreign policy. 
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is limited openness to the rule of qualified majority instead of unanimity with 
regard to Council decisions. 
In any case, this partial contamination of the intergovernmental method that 
traditionally reigned in matters of the Union's foreign and defence policy 
barely hides the deep divide that still today, despite the progress made with 
the Lisbon Treaty, separates the old first pillar from the other two. In 
particular, the clear exclusion of the EP from the decision-making processes 
in the field of foreign and security policy represents an evident break with 
Community method and contents. Therefore, the governance of the 
common security and defence policy has a series of problems of a 
'supranational constitutional' nature which are of crucial importance for the 
very fate of the European Union and for its evolution in an authentically 
democratic and federalist sense. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REASONS FOR THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN THE COMMON DEFENCE POLICY 
The constitutional reasons for the European Parliament's involvement in 
political decisions regarding possible Union interventions in conflict 
scenarios are to be found first of all in the need to guarantee the values and 
general principles of EU law. More specifically, these reasons concern the 
need to respect: 1) the principle of representative democracy in the 
organization and action of the European Union; and 2) the principles of 
institutional balance and of loyal cooperation between institutions. 
These principles, moreover, are closely linked to other fundamental 
constitutional principles, such as freedom, human dignity, equality, respect 
for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, the 
rule of law and pluralism. These are values common to the Member States on 
which the European Union is founded, according to Article 2 TEU. 
Therefore, compliance with the former may also have effects on the 
guarantee of the latter. 
1. The Need to Respect the Democratic Principle  
Firstly, the European Parliament's lack of effective powers of control could 
seriously undermine the democratic principle, one of the values on which the 
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European Union is founded (Article 2 TEU). The Preambles and the general 
principles enshrined in  the Treaties, starting from the Single European Act 
and the Maastricht Treaty, contain a strong reference to the attachment to 
democracy, the commitment to strengthen the democratic functioning of 
the institutions, and the need to build a Europe where decisions are taken as 
close as possible to the citizens.24 In fact, even before the democratic 
principle found explicit recognition in the Treaties, it had been indicated as 
the foundation of the Community's constitutional system in the Declaration 
on European Identity adopted in Copenhagen in December 1973 by the 
Heads of State or Government. That Declaration affirmed the intention to 
'defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of 
social justice and of respect for human rights', which 'are fundamental 
elements of the European Identity'.25 
Furthermore, the promotion of democracy has had strong recognition in the 
case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, starting with the 
Roquette Frères judgment of 1980.26 In that sentence, the Luxembourg 
Court annulled a Council regulation for lack of a EP opinion, because the EP 
consultation provided for by the Treaty 'is the means which allows the 
Parliament to play an actual part in the legislative process of the Community'. 
The Court emphasized that, 'although limited, it reflects at Community level 
the fundamental democratic principle that the peoples should take part in 
the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly'. 
Accordingly, 'due consultation of the Parliament in the cases provided for by 
 
24 On the democratic principle in the EU, see, among the others: Jos de Beus, 'Quasi-
National European Identity and European Democracy' (2001) 20 Law and 
Philosophy 283; Lindsay Lloyd, 'European approaches to democracy promotion' 
(2010) 65 International Journal 547; Kalypso Nicolaïdis, 'We, the Peoples of 
Europe...' (2004) 83 Foreign Affairs 97; Joseph H. H. Weiler, 'The European Union 
Belongs to its Citizens: Three Immodest Proposals' (1997) 7 The Good Society 26; 
Elisabeth Zoller, 'The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and the 
Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union' (2005) 12 Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 391. 
25 Declaration on European Identity, Copenhagen, 14 December 1973. 
26 Case 138/79 Roquette Frères v Council EU:C:1980:249. 
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the Treaty […] constitutes an essential formality disregard of which means 
that the measure concerned is void'.27 
As is known, in the matter of common foreign and security policy, ruled by 
Title V TEU, there is no room for legislative acts.28 This could lead one to 
believe that it is not also essential in this context to ensure an effective 
involvement of the EP in the decision-making process in order to respect the 
democratic principle. Nevertheless, political decisions aimed at allowing a 
military action imputable to the European Union will always have an 
enormous impact not only on the interests of all Member States but also, 
directly, on the interests of European citizens. This means that, in the 
common foreign and security policy, the effective involvement in the 
decision-making process of the European Parliament – the only institution 
democratically representative of the Europeans citizens – is the only way to 
ensure, albeit in a minimal form, respect for the principle of representative 
democracy. 
Moreover, the democratic principle today finds a clear and explicit 
recognition in Article 10 TEU, according to which '[t]he functioning of the 
Union shall be founded on representative democracy' and '[c]itizens are 
directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament'. The 
democratic principle is also referred to in Chapter 1 of Title V of the TEU, 
concerning the 'General provisions on the Union's external action'. Article 
21, paragraph 1, TEU states that  
The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, 
the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality 
and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and international law.  
Paragraph 2(b) of Article 21 indicates among the objectives of the Union's 
external action the aim to 'consolidate and support democracy, the rule of 
 
27 Ibid para 33.  
28 According to Article 24, paragraph 1, TEU '[…] The common foreign and security 
policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. […] The adoption of legislative 
acts shall be excluded […]'.  
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law, human rights and the principles of international law'. And again, 
paragraph 3 provides that:  
The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different 
areas of the Union's external action covered by this Title and by Part Five of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and of the external 
aspects of its other policies. 
It follows from the rules of the Treaty on European Union that the 
democratic principle is one of the constituent values of the common 
constitutional heritage capable of defining the common European identity. 
Furthermore, it is one of the objectives pursued by the European Union 
through its external action and it is explicitly indicated by the Treaty as one 
of the principles that the Union must respect, including in the context of its 
external action.  
This demonstrates the presence of a contradiction between, on the one hand, 
the abstract affirmation of the principle of representative democracy as a 
fundamental value of the Union and, on the other hand, the failure to 
implement the principle in question in the part of the TEU concerning the 
common foreign and security policy. 
2. The Need to Respect Principles of Institutional Balance and Loyal Cooperation 
A similar conclusion can be reached by considering two other EU principles, 
closely related to each other and, for this reason, worthy of being treated 
together: the principle of institutional balance and, above all, that of loyal 
collaboration between institutions, both provided for by Article 13, 
paragraph 2, of the TEU.29 Indeed, both these principles seem to impose, 
irrespective of the need for 'democracy' mentioned above, a greater 
involvement of the European Parliament in the decision to intervene 
militarily. 
 
29 According to Article 13, paragraph 2, TEU 'Each institution shall act within the 
limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the 
procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them. The institutions shall 
practice mutual sincere cooperation'.  
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The principle of institutional balance states that every institution shall act 
within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties and must 
respect the competences attributed by the Treaties to the other institutions. 
This principle was clearly outlined by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 
22 May 1990, European Parliament v. Council, with which the right to bring an 
action for annulment was recognized to apply also to the EP. For the Court, 
the Treaties  
set up a system for distributing powers among the different Community 
institutions, assigning to each institution its own role in the institutional 
structure of the Community and the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted 
to the Community.30  
Moreover, '[o]bservance of the institutional balance means that each of the 
institutions must exercise its powers with due regard for the powers of the 
other institutions' and it 'also requires that it should be possible to penalize 
any breach of that rule which may occur'.31 Therefore the Court stated that:  
The absence in the Treaties of any provision giving the Parliament the right 
to bring an action for annulment may constitute a procedural gap, but it 
cannot prevail over the fundamental interest in the maintenance and 
observance of the institutional balance laid down in the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities.32  
So far, the institutional balance seems mainly aimed at preserving the 
competences of the single institutions by imposing the observance of an ideal 
division of powers adapted to the sphere of the European Union. This first 
impression could give rise to the doubt that the principle of institutional 
balance mainly concerns the former first pillar. In this context, indeed, the 
division of competences between the institutions crosses the issue of the 
distinction between the legislative and the executive function. Parliament, 
through the exercise of the important functions attributed to it, has a role of 
 
30 Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council EU:C:1990:217, para 21.  
31 Ibid para 22. 
32 Ibid para 26. 
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primary importance in the formation of acts and therefore also of the 
political will of the Union.33  
In contrast, in the governance of the subject referred to in Title V TEU, the 
distinction of functions operates within a completely different scheme (see 
Articles 24-26 TEU), in which the European Council, the Council and the 
High Representative are the protagonists of a basically unitary decision-
making process. The latter is structured, roughly, on three levels: in a first 
phase, it is up to the European Council to set the general objectives and 
guidelines for the EU's action; in a second phase, it is up to the Council to 
take concrete decisions in accordance with those general guidelines; and 
finally, in a third phase, it is primarily up to the High Representative to 
implement these decisions. Therefore, in the context of Title V TEU, 
considering the very limited role played by the EP in this matter, it could be 
assumed that the principle of institutional balance guarantees only the 
European Parliament's right to be informed and consulted by the High 
Representative on the basis Article 26 TEU.34 
However, such an interpretation appears reductive for at least three reasons. 
First of all, the principle of institutional balance has a dynamic, rather than a 
static, nature. This is evidenced by the fact that this principle was not 
originally codified and that its evolution went hand in hand with the 
evolution of the functions of the European Parliament, legitimizing the 
expansion of the attributions of the latter beyond the letter of the Treaties.35 
Indeed, this principle is firmly linked to both the principle of loyal 
 
33 On the evolution of the institutional balance between Council, European Council, 
Commission and European Parliament, see Paul Craig, 'The Community Political 
Order' (2003) 10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 79. 
34 See above, section III. 
35 Suffice it to mention what happened with reference to the budgetary procedures. 
In this context, the powers of the European Parliament have gradually expanded, 
until The Lisbon Treaty put the EP on an equal footing with the Council in the 
annual budgetary procedure. 
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collaboration36 and the democratic principle,37 so that the evolution of these 
three fundamental constitutional elements of the EU is simultaneous.  
Secondly, the principle of institutional balance, which has also been defined 
as a 'normative, actionable formal principle',38 works with a clear 
constitutional vocation. Although this principle is not comparable to the 
principle of division of powers as it has evolved and transformed in the 
constitutional state experiences, it is inspired by state traditions. This 
implies that the area of the common foreign and security policy cannot be 
totally extraneous to the possibility for the EP to really influence the most 
important decisions, such as launching EU military missions in situations of 
armed conflict. This would breach the general principle of the balance of 
powers understood as a general criterion of a constitutional nature, referable, 
at least in theory, to the entire governance of the Union.  
Finally, it must be considered that the Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the 
implications and the dynamic dimension of the principle of institutional 
balance. It increasingly draws inspiration from the model of the state 
parliamentary democracies, as demonstrated, for example, by the new 
formulation of the provisions concerning the procedure for the 
Commission's formation and the regulation of legislative acts, where the 
powers of the EP have been expanded. It is very difficult to believe that the 
governance of the subjects related to in Title V is completely extraneous to 
 
36 In this sense see the position of Roland Bieber, 'The Settlement of Institutional 
Conflicts on the Basis of Article 4 of the EEC Treaty' (1984) 21 Common Market 
Law Review 505, which criticizes the aleatory character and the rigidity of the 
principle of institutional balance outlined by the Court of Justice, while 
emphasizing the importance of the principle of autonomy of the institutions in 
synergy with the principle of cooperation and the dynamic character of the 
institutional system. Without reaching Bieber's conclusions, however, the idea of 
a dynamic dimension of the balance of powers, as evidenced by the close 
connection with the principle of loyal cooperation, is nevertheless shareable. In the 
writers' opinion, this dynamic evolution has long been (slowly) proceeding in the 
direction of a continuous expansion of parliamentary attributions towards the 
model (for now far) represented by the parliamentary State democracies. 
37 See Götz Von Hippel, La séparation de pouvoirs dans les communautés européennes 
(Nancy, Publications du Centre européen universitaire 1965) 4-5. 
38 Case C-101/08 Audiolux and Others EU:C: 2009:626, Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para 
105.  
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this progressive adoption of solutions inspired by the state models of 
organization of powers, especially if we consider that the Lisbon Treaty has 
removed the pillar structure. 
The principle of institutional balance is, as mentioned, closely linked to that 
of loyal collaboration. The latter was originally provided for only with 
reference to the relationships between Member States and the European 
Community, being imposed by the then Article 10 TEC (now Article 4, 
paragraph 3, TEU) on the Member States towards the Community. 
Progressively, the Court of Justice derived from it also the principle of sincere 
cooperation between the European institutions, today explicitly enshrined in 
Article 13(2) TEU. In particular, in the judgment of 27 September 1988, Greece 
v. Council, the Luxembourg Court affirmed that  
the operation of the budgetary procedure, as it is laid down in the financial 
provisions of the Treaty, is based essentially on inter-institutional dialogue. 
That dialogue is subject to the same mutual duties of sincere cooperation 
which, as the Court has held, govern relations between the Member States 
and the Community institutions.39 
Concerning the relationship between the EP and the Council in the 
consultation procedure, in its ruling of 30 March 1995, case C-65/93, the 
Court held that, even in this circumstance, the same mutual obligations of 
sincere cooperation governing the relationships between Member States and 
the Community institutions prevail.40 Furthermore, in its judgment of 24 
November 2010, C-40/10, the Court of Justice stated that the Commission 
'must observe the duty of cooperation in good faith between the institutions, 
recognised by the caselaw […] and, since the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, expressly enshrined in the second sentence of Article 13(2) TEU'.41 
In the case of military interventions in conflict scenarios decided by the 
Union, the respect for the principle of institutional balance and for the duty 
of sincere cooperation between institutions could undoubtedly establish an 
obligation to involve the EP in the relevant political decision.  
 
39 Case 204/86 Greece v Council EU:C:1988:450, para 16. 
40 Case C-65/93 European Parliament v Council EU:C:1995:91, para 23.  
41 Case C-40/10 Commission v Council EU:C:2010:713, para 80. 
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3. Response to Possible Objections to Greater Parliamentary Involvement 
Having clarified the constitutional arguments for a greater EP involvement, 
the possible objections should also be considered. Among these objections, 
the following must be addressed. First of all, in many cases, the political 
decision to start a military action requires speed and unity of purpose, and the 
secrecy of operational plans is often a necessary condition for their effective 
realization. Secondly, the alleged democratic deficit of the supranational 
decision-making processes could be considered filled by the fact that, since 
in this matter the rule of unanimity is mainly applied, a military mission of the 
Union would presuppose a complete sharing by all the governments involved 
and, indirectly, also by the national parliaments exercising control over them. 
Thirdly, the exclusion of the European Parliament from the decision-making 
processes outlined in Title V could be considered balanced by the presence 
of other forms of parliamentary control, such as the power to be informed 
and consulted, the power of the purse and the power of no-confidence.  
However, these objections do not invalidate the thesis of the necessary EP 
involvement in the decision-making processes related to future military 
missions of the EU. As for the first, it must be highlighted that the executive 
can always undertake military actions without the prior involvement of 
parliament in emergency cases. In any case, the need to guarantee the 
effectiveness and efficiency of military missions can certainly justify a 
proportionate and reasonable limitation of the supervisory power of 
Parliament, but can never lead to its complete exclusion. 
With respect to the second argument, any provision for parliamentary 
scrutiny within the Member States is not enough to solve the problem of 
democratic deficit caused by a lack of parliamentary control at the 
supranational level. On the basis of Article 46 TEU, when decisions 
concerning PESCO are to be taken – by a qualified majority or by unanimity, 
as the case may be – only members of the Council representing the 
participating Member States shall take part in the vote. This means that, 
within PESCO, some important decisions do not involve all the Union's 
Member States, but only the participating members. Despite this, such 
decisions are taken in the name of the European Union and may have 
significant effects on the interests of the entire Union itself, of all its 
members and of European citizens. This means that, according to the 
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principle of subsidiarity,42 by reason of the scale and effects of such decisions, 
the involvement of national parliaments is not sufficient and an effective 
involvement of the European Parliament is necessary. 
As for the third argument, first of all it must be observed that, although it is 
true that the power to be informed and consulted facilitates transparency and 
debate on issues, it nevertheless turns out to be a blunt weapon if it is not 
accompanied by the power of prior authorization to the use of force or by 
other possible forms of indirect control of military power. Regarding the 
Parliament's power to control military spending through the approval of the 
budget and of the spending laws, in the current EU framework and within 
PESCO, the possibility of an effective control of military expenditure by the 
EP seems to be excluded.  
As for the power of no-confidence towards the executive, the EP has no 
power to politically undermine the Council by voting on a motion of censure. 
The motion of censure under Article 234 TFEU can affect the High 
Representative as a member of the Commission; in that case, however, the 
latter resigns only with regard to the functions exercised within the 
Commission. Consequently, with reference to the executive and 
representation powers exercised in the field of common foreign and defence 
policy, the High Representative seems not to be parliamentary accountable.  
V. MEMBER STATES' REQUIREMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY 
INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY MISSIONS ABROAD 
Another reason in support of the European Parliament's involvement in EU 
defence and military policies is related to the existence of a constitutional 
tradition common to the Member States that could be applicable also to the 
Union's legal system. We refer to the progressive framing, in the context of 
European constitutional law, of a constitutional principle that requires prior 
 
42 According to Article 5, paragraph 3, TEU, 'Under the principle of subsidiarity, in 
areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if 
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can 
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved 
at Union level'. 
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parliamentary involvement in the decision to participate in a military 
mission. 
The comparative analysis carried out by various scholars and research 
institutes clearly demonstrates that the principle of prior parliamentary 
approval of significant military missions is prevalent in the Member States' 
legal systems, as a constitutional rule explicitly stated or as an implicit 
constitutional principle.43  
In some legal systems, such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, the 
necessary parliamentary authorization for the use of military force is 
expressly provided for. In Germany the Bundesverfassungsgericht, with a ruling 
of 1994, established that from the Grundgesetz a constitutional principle can 
be derived, according to which the use of the armed forces abroad, even if 
decided by the government, is subject to the prior authorization by 
parliament. Following this and a subsequent similar ruling, the German 
legislator has accepted the (implicit) constitutional principle of 
parliamentary authorization for the actions of the German armed forces 
abroad.44 Thanks to this, in Germany 'the Bundestag has been an 
 
43 See, for example, Roman Schmidt-Radefeldt, Parlamentarische Kontrolle der 
internationalen Streitkräfteintegration (Duncker und Humblot 2005); Hans Born and 
Heiner Hänggi (eds), The "Double Democratic Deficit": Parliamentary Accountability 
and the Use of Force under International Auspices (Ashgate 2004); Hans Born, Axel 
Dowling, Teodora Fuior and Suzana Gavrilescu, Parliamentary Oversight of Civilian 
and Military ESDP Missions: The European and National Levels (European Parliament 
2007), study requested by the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and 
Defence; Sandra Dieterich, Hartwig Hummel, Stefan Marschall, 'Strengthening 
Parliamentary "War Powers" in Europe: Lessons from 25 National Parliaments' 
(2008) DCAF Policy Paper n. 27. Conversely Wolfgang Wagner, Dirk Peters, 
Cosima Glahn, 'Parliamentary War Powers Around the World, 1989-2004. A New 
Dataset' (2010) DCAF Policy Paper n. 22, claim that 'There is no discernible trend 
towards a parliamentarisation of war powers' and note that 'When existing rules 
are changed, parliaments are usually the losers' because 'several central and eastern 
European states have abolished parliament ex ante veto powers in the process of 
Nato accession'; however these authors could not consider the subsequent 
parliamentary powers evolution in some European countries, like France, Britain 
and Italy (see below in this section). 
44 BVerfGE 90, 286. The principle that requires a prior parliamentary authorization 
of the Bundestag for the use of armed forces was subsequently expanded and 
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exceptionally powerful and active parliament in controlling the deployment 
of armed forces'.45 In Italy, Article 78 of the Constitution states that 
'Parliament has the authority to declare a state of war and vest the necessary 
powers into the Government'. As such, it does not contain the explicit 
provision of a power of authorization of the parliament concerning the 
military missions that cannot be defined as 'war' in the formal sense. Yet, 
following the correct interpretation of the constitutional dictate, law no. 145 
of 2016 ('Provisions concerning the participation of Italy in international 
missions') provides, in Article 2, that the government deliberations regarding 
participation in international missions are transmitted to the Chambers. The 
latter shall 'promptly discuss and [...] authorize for each year the participation 
of Italy in international missions, possibly defining commitments for the 
Government, or deny the authorization'. 
Moreover, with the new millennium, a tendency to strengthen parliament's 
influence on the exercise of military power has emerged, albeit in different 
forms and sizes, in other European states. Even if it refers to a state that is set 
to leave the European Union, the example of what happened in the United 
Kingdom is extremely significant. In the UK, the Cabinet Manual of 2011 
recognized the existence of a new constitutional convention that imposed 
the rule, albeit not 'justiciable', of the prior involvement of the House of 
Commons in the decision-making process concerning the use of military 
force in conflict situations.46 As such, a full debate and a substantive vote by 
the lower House today seem to have become necessary steps – at least on the 
conventional level – to undertake any significant military action, with the 
exception of emergency cases.47 In France, although the decision to intervene 
 
strengthened by the Bundesverfassungsgericht itself on the occasion of another 
important ruling of 7 May 2008 (BVerfGE 121, 135). 
45 Wolfgang Wagner, 'The Bundestag as a Champion of Parliamentary Control of 
Military Missions' (2017) 35 Sicherheit und Frieden 60. 
46 The Cabinet Manual. A Guide to Laws, Conventions and Rules on the Operation 
Of Government, paragraph 5.38.  
47 See Philippe Lagassé, 'Parliament and the War Prerogative in the United Kingdom 
and Canada: Explaining Variations in Institutional Change and Legislative 
Control' (2017) 70 Parliamentary Affairs 280; Gavin Phillipson, Parliament's Role in 
the Use of Military Action after the Syria Vote (presentation at The Constitution Unit, 
University College London 2014); James Strong, 'Why Parliament Now Decides on 
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belongs to the executive, the loi constitutionnelle no. 2008-724 amended 
Article 35 of the Constitution, adding three new paragraphs to strengthen the 
parliament's role in the determinations concerning the employment of the 
French armed forces abroad. In particular, it introduced a duty of timely 
information on the part of the government and, above all, the parliament's 
power to authorize the extension of a military action lasting more than four 
months. Finally, in 2003, in the Cyprian presidential system a veto power of 
parliament concerning the deployment of the armed forces abroad was 
introduced. 
It is not possible to describe here the different constitutional and legislative 
procedures related to the decision to intervene militarily in all 28 Member 
States of the European Union. However, the abovementioned comparative 
analysis shows that, in the European context, a constitutional principle – in 
some cases implicit, in other explicit – for which, outside of emergency cases, 
the involvement of the national parliament in the decision to use the armed 
forces in conflict scenarios is necessary, seems to have gradually been 
established at the level of the legal systems of the Member States. 
The few exceptions that exist concern almost exclusively those Member 
States that do not have a parliamentary form of government, such as France48 
or Poland, which have a semi-presidential system, or Cyprus (where, as said, 
in 2003 a parliamentary veto power was introduced), which has a presidential 
system.49 
In some countries, such as Hungary and other Eastern European states, a 
distinction between international mandatory operations (including NATO 
and EU missions) and other operations is made, in order to exempt the 
former from the requirement of parliamentary approval. This means that 
parliamentary approval is necessary for 'other operations', while it is not 
necessary for international mandatory operations, including EU missions. 
This demonstrates, from a different point of view, the need to involve at least 
 
War: Tracing the Growth of the Parliamentary Prerogative through Syria, Libya 
and Iraq' (2015) 17 British Journal of Politics and International Relations 604. 
48 However, as said, the loi constitutionnelle no. 2008-724 has given parliament an 
increased role. 
49 See Article 136 of the Polish Constitution, Article 35 of the French Constitution 
and Article 50 of the Constitution of Cyprus. 
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the European Parliament in the defence policy-making process, in order to 
ensure parliamentary control also on these interventions.  
It should be noted that some scholars are skeptical towards the hypothesis of 
a progressive parliamentarisation of war powers in contemporary 
democracies. However, most of them recognise that state systems always 
establish, if not a veto power, at least an involvement of parliament in the 
decision-making processes, for example through the consultation of the 
whole Parliament or of individual MPs within the defence councils.50  
In addition to those general principles of European Union law originating 
from the case-law of the Court of Justice and belonging to the primary 
sources of law, there are also those principles which are derived from the 
parallel examination of the national legal systems, and which are therefore 
borrowed from the 'common constitutional traditions' of the Member 
States. The Treaty on European Union explicitly mentions them in Article 6, 
paragraph 3, where it states that  
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall 
constitute general principles of the Union's law.  
Even the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union cites them in 
Article 340, paragraph 2:  
In the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with 
the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good 
any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of 
their duties. 
Although Article 6 TEU refers only to fundamental rights and Article 340 
TFEU has a scope limited to the non-contractual liability of the EU, the 
Court of Justice has made use in many cases – and also in different matters – 
of the principles common to the national legal systems, both in the 
 
50 Wagner, Peters, Glahn (n 44) 26: 'Taking a closer look at the deployment rules in 
all countries, it becomes clear that both the complete exclusion of parliament from 
decision-making over military deployments and full-blown parliamentary veto over 
all military operations are only two extreme cases; in between there is a wealth of 
different forms of parliamentary inclusion'. 
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interpretation of written law and to fill the gaps in the Treaties. The 
reference to the principles which are generally accepted in the national 
systems is in fact constant in the jurisprudence of the European Court. 
The Court has expressly underlined that, in pursuance of the tasks conferred 
on it by the Treaty, it can rule  
in accordance with generally accepted methods of interpretation, in 
particular by reference to the fundamental principles of the Community legal 
system and, where necessary, general principles common to the legal systems 
of the Member States.51  
It has also affirmed that  
the second paragraph of Article 215 of the Treaty [now Article 340 TFEU] 
refers, as regards the non-contractual liability of the Community, to the 
general principles common to the laws of the Member States, from which, in 
the absence of written rules, the Court also draws inspiration in other areas 
of Community law.52 
Furthermore, it is not necessary that these common principles are in force in 
all Member States. The construction of the 'synthesis' between the various 
legal systems by the Court and the identification of the solution to be 
transposed at the supranational level are not subordinated to the number of 
convergent systems, but to the quality of the solution to be chosen. In other 
words, the comparative elements deriving from the examination of the 
national legal systems constitute a source of inspiration within which the 
Court selects the instruments that are most suitable for the objectives and 
structure of the European legal order. 
In light of the elements referred to, the principle of prior parliamentary 
authorization of armed interventions – which is today provided for by many 
European countries – could be considered as a 'common principle for the 
Member States'. This constitutes a further and independent reason, in 
addition to those indicated in section IV, for justifying the need for 
involvement of the EP in the decision of an EU military intervention. 
 
51 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur and Factortame EU:C:1996:79, 
para 27. 
52 Ibid para 41. 
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VI. THE PROSPECTS OF ESTABLISHING A POWER OF CONTROL OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT OVER EU MILITARY MISSIONS 
At present, two perspectives can be glimpsed for the involvement of the 
European Parliament in the decision-making processes related to the 
possible future EU military missions: the first on the basis of existing 
regulation, the second on the basis of regulation that could be approved in 
the future. 
1. Reform Based on Existing Regulation 
According to the current legislation, the power of control of the European 
Parliament could already be affirmed by way of interpretation, as shown by 
the analysis carried out in the previous section. In this regard, we must also 
consider the possibility of an intervention by the EU Court of Justice, which 
could affirm this principle with a binding ruling, thus completing the EU law 
under this specific aspect. Article 275 TFEU does indeed state that the Court 
of Justice 'shall not have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating 
to the common foreign and security policy nor with respect to acts adopted 
on the basis of those provisions'. However, pursuant to paragraph 2 of the 
same article, 'the Court shall have jurisdiction to monitor compliance with 
Article 40 of the Treaty on European Union' and to rule on certain 
proceedings. In accordance with Article 40 TEU:  
The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not 
affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the 
institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union 
competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union.  
Using this competence established by Article 275 TFEU, the Court of Justice 
could 're-evaluate' the role of the EP and resolve by means of interpretation 
what – otherwise – would appear to be a serious illogicality of the EU legal 
system.53 Something similar happened in Germany, where, as already 
 
53 The Court of Justice has already had occasion to deal with the EP's role in the 
external action of the Union, even if with regard to the conclusion of international 
agreements concerning also the CFSP and not to the specific area of defence and 
military missions. The EU Court in two cases has partly accepted the European 
Parliament's claims, annulling two Council's decisions because of the infringement 
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mentioned, the principle involved was first introduced by the Federal 
Constitutional Court54 and then developed by the legislator.55 
Regardless of the possible intervention by the Court, institutional practice 
can always compensate for the lack of parliament's 'constitutional war 
powers', as demonstrated by the constitutional tradition of several Member 
States. Even in these contexts, constitutional law often does not provide an 
exhaustive regulation of parliamentary powers of war. Firstly, this is because 
constitutional texts have not been updated in this area and therefore are 
influenced by the now obsolete concept of war in the formal sense. Secondly, 
it is inevitable and even appropriate that the written constitutions leave 
much of the regulation of this complex subject to the organic laws 
implementing the constitutional provisions, parliamentary rules, 
conventions and application practices. The example of Belgium is significant 
in this regard. In the silence of the constitution, which deals only with the 
king's power to declare war,56 a practice developed that provides for the 
allocation to the parliament of the power to authorize the government's 
 
of the information requirement laid down in Article 218(10) TFEU. According to 
this rule, Parliament must be 'immediately and fully informed at all stages of the 
procedure' with reference to all international agreements concluded by the 
European Union, including those within the scope of the CFSP. This obligation 'is 
prescribed in order to ensure that the Parliament is in a position to exercise 
democratic scrutiny of the European Union's external action' (Case C-658/11 
European Parliament v Council EU:C:2014:2025, para 79). Therefore, '[w]hile, 
admittedly, the role conferred on the Parliament in relation to the CFSP remains 
limited, since the Parliament is excluded from the procedure for negotiating and 
concluding agreements relating exclusively to the CFSP, the fact remains that the 
Parliament is not deprived of any right of scrutiny in respect of that European 
Union policy' (Case C-263/14 European Parliament v Council EU:C:2016:435, para 
69). Indeed 'participation by the Parliament in the legislative process is the 
reflection, at Union level, of a fundamental democratic principle that the people 
should participate in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a 
representative assembly' (ibid para 70). 
54 See the rulings of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of 12 July 1994 (BVerfGE 90, 286) and 
of 7 May 2008 (BVerfGE 121, 135).  
55 On 18 March 2005 the German Parliament passed an Act ('Parliamentary 
Participation Act') requiring in principle prior parliamentary consent for the 
'deployment of armed forces abroad' (2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I 775). 
56 See Article 167 of Belgian Constitution.  
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decision to intervene militarily. Indeed, the Belgian practice provides for the 
instrument of the resolution parlementaire. In Italy, as mentioned in section V, 
a very similar practice was recently codified within a new ordinary law. 
Therefore, as already seen in other fields, even in this area the Union's 
institutional practice could take the cue from the aforementioned trends, 
which now concern a large part of the Member States' legal systems. The 
'contamination' of the multilevel systems, the importance of comparative law 
in the courts' judgments and the influence of the common constitutional 
traditions of the Member States suggest that, at least theoretically, such a 
legal solution could also be pursued within the current institutional 
framework of the Union. 
2. Reform Based on Future Regulation 
The principle of the prior parliamentary authorization of the Union's tasks 
(or at least of an effective involvement of the European Parliament in the 
relevant decision-making process) could be introduced in the European 
context also through the inclusion within the TEU of a rule similar to that 
explicitly laid down in the constitution of some Member States. For example, 
Article 16 of Chapter 15 of the Swedish Constitution ('Deployment of armed 
forces') states that:  
The Government may send Swedish armed forces to other countries or 
otherwise deploy such forces in order to fulfil an international obligation 
approved by the Riksdag. Swedish armed forces may also be sent to other 
countries or be deployed if: 1. it is permitted by an act of law setting out the 
conditions for such action; or 2. the Riksdag permits such action in a special 
case.57 
Article 100 of the Constitution of the Netherlands provides that  
1. The Government shall inform the States General in advance if the armed 
forces are to be deployed or made available to maintain or promote the 
international legal order. This shall include the provision of humanitarian aid 
in the event of armed conflict.  
 
57 The Constitution of Sweden <https://bit.ly/2QE6pAR> accessed 31 May 2019.  
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2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply if compelling reasons exist to 
prevent the provision of information in advance. In this event, information 
shall be supplied as soon as possible.58 
Article 19, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of Denmark states that:  
Except for purposes of defence against an armed attack upon the Realm or 
Danish forces the King shall not use military force against any foreign state 
without the consent of the Folketing. Any measure which the King may take 
in pursuance of this provision shall immediately be submitted to the 
Folketing. If the Folketing is not in session it shall be convoked 
immediately.59  
Furthermore, according to paragraph 3 of Article 19:  
The Folketing shall appoint from among its Members a Foreign Affairs 
Committee, which the Government shall consult prior to the making of any 
decision of major importance to foreign policy. Rules applying to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee shall be laid down by Statute.  
Therefore, the theoretical possibilities of establishing – by way of 
interpretation or through a revision of the Treaties – a power of effective 
control of the European Parliament on EU military missions exist. However, 
it is necessary, first of all, to raise awareness that the current TEU rules on the 
role of the European Parliament in the common defence policy are largely 
inadequate.  
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Contemporary democracies must strike a difficult balance between the need 
for effectiveness and efficiency of military interventions and the demand for 
full democratic control over the use of force. In the European context, many 
constitutions explicitly or implicitly find this balance in the allocation to the 
executive body of the decision-making power to commence a military action 
on the one hand, and of the power of prior approval of such decision to the 
parliamentary body on the other. Generally speaking, the possible complete 
 
58 The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands <https://bit.ly/2oz6nMU> 
accessed 31 May 2019.  
59 The Constitutional Act of Denmark <http://www.stm.dk/_p_10992.html> 
accessed 31 May 2019.  
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exclusion of parliamentary control over the decision-making process related 
to the commencement of a military action can only be justified as a last resort, 
in the presence of a serious and immediate threat to national security. 
Moving to the supranational level, despite the gradual construction of a 
European supranational military power lastly increased by PESCO, the EU 
defence governance does not provide for any adequate form of parliamentary 
control. The presence of a European Parliament with a direct popular 
election, representative of European citizens and equipped with fundamental 
functions within the EU which, nevertheless, cannot intervene with a truly 
incisive power in the determination of the common security and defence 
policy, appears to be contradictory.  
The lack of involvement of the EP in this area conflicts, first and foremost, 
with some important EU general principles, such as democracy, institutional 
balance and subsidiarity, which in turn are linked to other principles like 
equality, respect for human rights and pluralism. Moreover, it does not take 
into account the progressive framing, in almost all European countries, of a 
constitutional principle that requires the prior parliamentary involvement in 
the decision to participate in a military mission. This could be considered as 
a 'common principle for the Member States', applicable also to the Union's 
legal system, being moreover linked to the democratic principle, to the 
principle of institutional balance and to the principle of mutual sincere 
cooperation between institutions. 
There are important arguments for greater EP involvement. Political 
decisions aimed at allowing a military action imputable to the European 
Union have enormous direct impact on the interests of all European citizens. 
The parliamentary body is the only one that allows the full involvement of all 
the political forces represented in it, so that the opposition can give its 
fundamental contribution to the discussion, whatever the majority decides. 
This guarantees the complexity, depth and transparency of the decision-
making processes. 
Moreover, although for now there is no certainty about the concrete 
development prospects of the Union's foreign and defence policy and about 
future EU military missions, it can reasonably be expected that the 
enhancement of the EP's role could lead to the rejection of some – or several 
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– of these missions. For these reasons, establishing a power of control of the 
European Parliament in the context of common security and defence policy 
is a necessary step for the evolution of the European Union in a genuinely 
democratic and federalist sense. 
 
